Abstract. We investigate a general class of (black-box) constructions for range extension of weak pseudorandom functions: a construction based on m independent functions F1, . . . , Fm is given by a set of strings over {1, . . . , m} * , where for example { 2 , 1, 2 } corresponds to the function X → [F2(X), F2(F1(X))]. All efficient constructions for range expansion of weak pseudorandom functions that we are aware of are of this form.
Introduction
Pseudorandomness, introduced by Blum and Micali, is a crucial concept in theoretical computer science in general, and cryptography in particular. Informally, an object is pseudorandom if no efficient adversary can distinguish it from a truly random one. The most popular pseudorandom objects are pseudorandom generators (PRG), functions (PRF), and permutations (PRP). A PRG is a function prg : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m where m > n and no efficient A can distinguish prg(U n ) from U m , where U i denotes the uniform distribution over i bit strings. A PRF is a family of functions F : {0, 1} × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , where no efficient A can distinguish F (U , .) from a uniformly random function. Weak PRFs, are defined similarly to PRFs, but where the adversary gets only to see the outputs on random inputs (and not on inputs of his choice). PRGs, PRFs, and PRPs are equivalent, i.e. black-box reducible, to one-way functions [4, 3, 6] . Unfortunately these reductions are quite inefficient, and therefore practical pseudorandom objects are either constructed from scratch (like the AES block-cipher, which is supposed to be a PRP) or from stronger assumptions than OWFs (in particular number theoretic assumptions like Decisional Diffie-Hellman).
Range Extension for PRGs and PRFs. From a PRG prg : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 2n one can efficiently construct a PRG with a larger range: on input X ∈ {0, 1} n compute Y L Y R ← prg(X) and output the 4n-bit string Z ← prg(Y L ) prg(Y R ). One can now recursively apply prg on input Z in order to get a pseudorandom 8n-bit string and so on. The security of this construction follows by a simple hybrid argument.
From a PRF prf : {0, 1} × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n we can get a PRF prf : {0, 1} t × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} nt with larger range as prf (k 1 , . . . , k t , x) = prf (k 1 , x) . . . prf (k t , x)
This construction also works for weak PRFs, but is not very practical as the number of keys is linear in the expansion factor. Let bin(i) denote the binary representation of i padded with 0's to the length log t . The following construction of a {0, 1} × {0, 1} n− log t → {0, 1} nt function prf (k, x) = prf (k, x bin(0)) . . . prf (k, x bin(t − 1)) just needs a single key, and prf is easily seen to be a PRF if prf is. Unfortunately this construction does not work for weak PRFs (just consider a weak PRF where the output does not depend on the last input bit).
Range Extension for weak PRFs. Efficient range extension for weak PRFs has been investigated in [2, 10, 11] . All constructions considered in these papers can be defined by an ordered set α of strings over [m] def = {1, . . . , m}. The input to the construction are m keys k 1 , . . . , k m for the fixed output length PRF F , and a single input x to F . Each string s ∈ α now defines how to compute a part of the output, for example s = 2, 1, 3 corresponds to the value F k3 (F k1 (F k2 (x))), thus the expansion factor is the size of α. We give a formal definition for such constructions, which we call expansions, in Section 3.
Classifying Expansions. Not all expansions are secure in the sense of being a weak PRF whenever the underlying component F is a weak PRF. Before we continue, the reader might take a look at the three expansions given in the figure below, and try to answer the following question: if F is a weak PRF, which of the three length doubling constructions will also be a weak PRF (here k 1 , k 2 are two random independent keys).
In this paper we exactly classify which expansions are secure and which are not (cf. Theorem 1). Interestingly there are three (and not just two) natural classes which come up, we will call them good, bad, and ugly (the three constructions in the figure above are simple examples of a good, a bad, and an ugly expansion). We call expansions whose security can be proven by a black-box reduction 3 good. We call an expansion bad, if its insecurity can be proven by a black-box reduction. There are also expansion which are neither good nor bad, we call them ugly. In this paper we also consider the setting where (ii) is not necessarily satisfied, as the function is realized by some oracle, we call such functions simply random functions (RF). If (i) only holds for distinguishers which may query the function on random inputs, we prepend the term "weak" (like weak PRF). Functions which cannot be distinguished from random by any (and not just any efficient) distinguisher making some bounded number of queries are called quasirandom functions (QRF). 4 In particular any function which is a RF relative to a PSPACE oracle is a QRF.
5
We use the term randomized function to denote a function which is not deterministic. This could be an efficient family of functions, where a function is sampled by choosing a random key. It could also be an oracle implementing a function, where the oracle uses randomness. Clearly, any random function is a randomized function as a deterministic function is easily distinguished from random, the converse is not true in general.
Related Work
Optimal Expansions. Efficient range expansion for weak PRFs have been investigated by Damgård and Nielsen [2] . They prove that there are good expansions which achieve an exponential expansion factor of roughly 2 m/2 − 1 (using m keys). This has been improved to roughly 3 m/2 − 1 in [11] and to 2 m − 1 in [10] . From our classification it follows (Corollary 1) that 2 m − 1 is indeed the best possible.
6
Expansions in Minicrypt. In [13], we show that in Minicrypt, i.e. under the assumption that public-key cryptography does not exist 7 , some ugly constructions 8 are secure. We do not know if relative to this assumption all ugly constructions are secure (in this paper we show that relative to a PSPACE oracle all ugly constructions are secure).
Applications
Weak PRFs are a strictly weaker primitive than PRFs, and thus requiring that some construction (like AES) is only a weak PRF is less of an assumption than assuming it to be a "regular" PRF. 9 Still, for many applications, weak PRFs are enough. An example is symmetric encryption [12, 2, 10] . The scheme defined by encrypting a message M as (r, F (k, r) ⊕ M ), where r is sampled uniformly at random, is IND-CPA secure if F is a weak PRF [12] . There is some overhead as the ciphertext is |r| bits longer than the plaintext, but using range extension for weak PRFs, a message of any length can be encrypted [2] , and thus the overhead is independent of the message length.
In particular, when using the optimal expansion from [10] in the above scheme one needs m = log 2 (|M |/n + 1) shared keys (n being the block-length) for the (fixed output length) weak PRF (those keys can also be computed by expanding a single key, see [10] ). This expansion has a "depth" of m, by which we mean that to compute some elements of the output, one will have to invoke the weak PRF up to m times sequentially. Let us, however, stress that to compute all 2 m − 1 outputs, one only needs a total number of 2 m − 1 invocations. This is no contradiction, as if we compute an element with depth c, all the c − 1 values computed on the way will also be part of the output.
Although a depth of m is only logarithmic in the expansion factor, this might already be too much (say, due to hardware restrictions). We show (Corollary 2) that if we require a smaller depth c < m, then the best expansion factor we can get is 
Basic Definitions
By L X and R X we denote the left and right half of a bit string X of even length, respectively. We denote with 
For an expansion α, #α = m, |α| = t, and functions F 1 , . . . , F m , each X → X , we define the function C α F1,...,Fm = X → X t as follows. On input X ∈ X , the i'th component (i ∈ [t]) of the output is computed using s i as
We will refer to the above computation as the evaluation of the i'th chain. 
The Good, the Bad & the Ugly
We classify the expansions into three classes depending on the security they guarantee for C α F . The Good: α is good if the security of C α F as a weak random function can be efficiently black-box reduced to the security of F as a weak random function.
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So whenever F is a weak random function, also C α F is, and moreover this holds relative to any oracle. The Bad: α is bad if there is an efficient construction F which uses some function F as a black-box, such that the security of F as a weak random function 10 The reduction being efficient means that from any adversary A which breaks the security of C α F , we construct an adversary B where B A,F breaks the security of F , and the size of B (as an oracle circuit) is polynomial in the size of α and the range of F .
can be efficiently black-box reduced to the security of F as a weak random function, but C α F is not a weak random function. The Ugly: α is ugly if it is neither good nor bad.
We now give a simple classification of all expansions into three classes G, B and U, which by Theorem 1 below are exactly the good, the bad, and the ugly expansions.
Definition 1 An expansion α = {s 1 , . . . , s t } is -of type B if it does contain a string with two consecutive identical letters or two identical strings, i.e.
∃i, k where
-of type G if it is not of type B and whenever a letter c appears before a letter d in some s ∈ α, then d does not appear before c in any string s ∈ α, i.e.
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∀s, s ∈ α, i, j, i , j :
-of type U if it is not of type G or B.
Theorem 1 (main) .
(i) An expansion is good if and only if it is of type G.
(ii) An expansion is bad if and only if it is of type B.
(iii) An expansion is ugly if and only if it is of type U.
That G expansions are good and B expansions are bad follows by rather simple black-box reductions (Lemmata 1 and 2), the "only if" part is much harder. In order to show that the U expansions are ugly, one has to come up with an oracle implementing a random function, such that relative to this oracle the expansion is not secure (thus it is not good), and another oracle relative to which it is secure (thus it is not bad). For the latter oracle we use a PSPACE oracle, as we show (Theorem 2) that for QRFs (recall that any RF is a QRF relative to a PSPACE oracle) any expansion which is not of type B, is secure. The following table summarizes the proof of the theorem. For some c < m, consider the expansion we get by removing all s ∈ α of length more than c from the optimal expansion just described. This expansion is still good, and it is not hard to show that it is the best good expansion of depth c using m keys. Note that Corollary 1 is just a special case of Corollary 2 for the case c = m.
The Bad Expansions are Exactly B
To prove that expansions outside of B are not bad, we use the random systems framework of Maurer [7] . Here we only give a rather informal and restricted exposition of the framework, in particular we only consider known-plaintext attacks (KPA), as this is the only attack relevant for this paper. Notation. We use capital calligraphic letters like X to denote sets, capital letters like X to denote random variables, and small letters like x denote concrete values. To save on notation we write X i for X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X i . Random Systems. Informally, a random system is a system which takes inputs X 1 , X 2 , . . . and generates, for each new input X i , an output Y i which depends probabilistically on the inputs and outputs seen so far. We define random systems in terms of the distribution of the outputs Y i conditioned on X i Y i−1 , more formally: An (X , Y)-random system F is a sequence of conditional probability distributions P
i , y i−1 ) the probability that F will output y i ∈ Y on input x i ∈ X conditioned on the fact that F did output y j ∈ Y on input x j ∈ X for j = 1, . . . , i − 1.
Uniformly random functions (URFs) are random systems which will be important in this paper, throughout R n,m will denote a URF {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m . Conditions for Random Systems. With F A we denote the random system F, but which additionally defines an internal binary random variable after each query (called a condition). Let A i ∈ {0, 1} denote the condition after the i'th query. We set A 0 = 0 and require the condition to be monotone which means that A i = 1 ⇒ A i+1 = 1 (i.e. when the condition failed, it will never hold again). Let a i denote the event A i = 1, then with ν KPA (F A , a k ) we denote the probability of the event a k occurring when F A is queried on random inputs, i.e.
Indistinguishability. For (X , Y)-random systems F and G, we denote with ∆ KPA k (F, G) the distinguishing advantage of any unbounded distinguisher in a k query known-plaintext attack. This advantage is simply the statistical distance, i.e. with X k being uniformly random over
A is equivalent to G B while the respective condition holds:
We say that F A is dominated by G, which is denoted by F A G, if on any input x i and for any possible output y i the probability that F A (x i ) output y i and the condition A holds, is at most the probability that G(
or equivalently ∀x i , y i : Pr
The following are the two main propositions of the framework (restricted to the case of KPA attacks).
Proposition 2 For any random systems F and G, there exist conditions A and B such that
Proposition 1 is quite easy to prove and appeared in the original paper [7] . Proposition 2 is from (the yet unpublished) [9] , a weaker version of this proposition appeared in [8] .
Expansions not in B are not Bad
By the following theorem, C α F1,...,Fm is a weak quasirandom function whenever the F i 's are weak QRFs and α is not in B. The distance of the output of C α F1,...,Fm on q random queries can be upper bounded by the sum of the distances of the F i 's on qα i random queries (recall that α i is the number of invocations of F i on an invocation of C α F1,...,Fm ), plus some term which is small unless q · α is in the order of 2 n/2 .
Theorem 2 For any expansion α = {s 1 , . . . , s t } which is not of type B, any randomized functions F i : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , 1 ≤ i ≤ #α := m, and every q ∈ N:
Proof. To save on notation let
where the R i 's are independent instantiations of R n,n . By the triangle inequality
The theorem follows from the two claims below, which bound the two terms on the right hand side of (1) respectively.
Proof (of Claim 1). We define a condition D on I as follows: the condition is satisfied as long as for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there was no nontrivial collision on the inputs to the component R i . Here the trivial collisions are the "unavoidable" collisions which occur when two chains have the same prefix. For example in C the inputs to R 1 in the two different chains are always identical, the same holds for the inputs to R 2 (but not for R 3 or R 4 ). We now show (using that α is not of type B) that this condition satisfies I D R n,n·t , i.e.
(2) Assume we invoke I on the i'th query x i ∈ {0, 1} n , and that d i−1 , i.e. the condition was satisfied after the (i − 1)'th query. We evaluate the t = |α| chains of I = C α R1,...,Rm one by one and assume that the s i 's are ordered by increasing length.probability exactly 2 −n . The probability that we get fresh inputs (to the last components) on all t chains and the outputs will be consistent with y i in all chains is thus at most 2 −n·t . On the other hand, if at some point we have an input which is not fresh, then there has been a collision. Now, as no two chains are equivalent (as α is not in B) and we process them by increasing length, it follows that this collision was a nontrivial one, and thus d i . This concludes the proof of (2). The first step of
follows by Proposition 1 using I D R n,n·t . The second step follows by the birthday bound: the fact that d q means that at some point for some i ∈ [m] the uniformly random output of R i did collide with some "old" input to R i . As R i is invoked q · α i times, the probability that there will be a collision is at most (q · α i ) 2 /2 n+1 . To get the probability that there will be a collision for any R i , i ∈ [m], we take the union bound. Claim 2
Proof (of Claim 2). For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let A i and B i be conditions such that (the existence of such conditions follows by Proposition 2)
To save on notation let
Let b ⇒ q d denote the event defined on I B∧D which holds if at any timepoint up to after the q'th query, either D holds or B does not hold (or equivalently, either D does not fail, or it only fails after B fails). The first step below follows by Proposition 1 using (5). The last step follows by the union bound and observing
We can bound the first term of (6) using (3) as ν
We now bound the second term of (6), using
qm in the first inequality, and the union bound in the second step:
The term ν
is the probability that when querying I on q random inputs, the condition B i defined on R i will fail, and it will do so before D fails. Now, as long as D holds, R i is invoked on uniformly random inputs: the inputs are either part of the global input (which is random in a KPA attack), or it is the output of some URF R j . It is important to note that in this case always j = i, 13 so R i is never invoked on its own output, which guarantees that (while D holds) the inputs to R i are not only random, but also independent of R i . So the probability that b 
, where the second step follows by (4).
Type B Expansions are Bad
Lemma 1 Expansions of type B are bad.
Proof. To prove the lemma we show a black-box construction of a random function G P based on a permutation P such that:
(i) The security of G P as a weak random function can be black-box reduced to the security of P as a random permutation.
(ii) For every bad expansion α, C α G P is not a weak random function. Note that we assume that G has access to an oracle which implements a random permutation, 14 and not just a weak RF as required by the lemma. We can do this as random permutations and weak random functions are equivalent, in the sense that both can be constructed from (and imply the existence of) functions which are hard to invert on random inputs 15 via a black-box reduction [3, 4, 6] . To simplify the argument, in the proof we assume that the random permutation P : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} 2n is a uniformly random permutation (URP). As by definition a random permutation is indistinguishable from a URP, this does not change the statement.
We first prove statement (i), namely that G P is a weak random function (in fact, as we assume that P is a URP, we can even show that G P is a weak quasirandom function).
2 n Proof (of Claim 3). By the triangle inequality
G P is equivalent to P unless we happen to query G P on input 0 2n or an input X where the first n bits of P −1 (X) are 0 n . For a random X, this happens with probability ≤ 2 −2n + 2 −n . By the union bound
By the so called PRF/PRP switching lemma (see e.g. [1] ) we have
The claim follows from (7), (8), and (9). Now we prove statement (ii), i.e. that for every bad expansion α, C α G P is not a weak random function. Recall that α = {s 1 , . . . , s t } is bad if either s i = s j for some i = j or there is a s i with two consecutive identical letters, i.e. for some j :
. When s i = s j then also the i'th and j'th tuple in the output of C α G P (X) are identical for any X, and thus easy to distinguish from random. We now consider the other case. Let α be any expansion where for some element s ∈ α we have for some j that s[j] = s[j + 1]. As we prove a negative statement, we can without loss of generality assume that s is the only element in α. We claim that C X 0 = X and for i = 1, . . . , |s| :
Now by the definition of G P , for any Z and i
2n , and as G P i (0 2n ) = 0 2n for any i we get X = 0 2n for all ≥ j. For concreteness let us illustrate this computation on the example α = { 1, 2, 2, 3 }. Here P 2 is the P used by G P 2 , and
5 The Good Expansions are Exactly G
Type G Expansions are Good
The following lemma is from [10] , for completeness we give a proof in the appendix.
Lemma 2 Expansions of type G are good.
Expansions not in G are Not Good
Lemma 3 Expansions not in G are not good.
By Lemma 1 expansions of type B are not good. It remains to show that there exists an oracle O relative to which a weak random function F O exists, but where for any expansion α = {s 1 , . . . , s t } of type U the function C α F O is not weakly random. The oracle O we construct will consist of two parts, which can be accessed by setting the first part of the input to either "eval" or "break".
Let n be our security parameter (think of O as a family of oracles, one for each n ∈ N). Let m = max i |s i | and = n 3 m. Let
We will often write the key as a subscript
). The all zero string 0 n is excluded from the valid keys as later 0 n will have the special meaning of "no key".
We now define the "eval" part of the oracle. Initially, 2 mn − 1 disjoint subsets of {0, 1} , each of size 2 n , are sampled. Each such set corresponds to an ordered sequence of at most m (and at least one) keys, the set corresponding to the keys k 1 , . . . , k m , m ≤ m is denoted S 0 (m−m )n k1 k2 ... k m . With S 0 we denote the elements from {0, 1} which are in no set, i.e.
n , i.e. all but a 2 −n fraction of elements from {0, 1} are in S 0 ). Now for any key k, O(eval, k, .) maps the elements from S 0 at random to S 0 (m−1)n k . As for the inputs not in S 0 , for any key k and keys k 1 , . . . , k m , O(eval, k, .) is defined as a random bijective function from S 0 (m−m )n k1 k2 ... k m to S 0 (m−m −1)n k1 k2 ... k m k (where for m = m , we shift the leftmost key out, i.e. we map S k1 k2 ... km to S k2 ... km k ). Note that this means that for any t ≤ m and x ∈ S 0 a value computed as
For a computationally bounded distinguisher, this y will look random, but the computationally unbounded "break" part of the oracle (defined below) can learn the keys k 1 , . . . , k t used.
We now define the "break" part of the oracle. O(break, .) is a ({0, 1} ) . . Y t the probability that O(break, {Y i , Y j }) = 1 is very small: we get a rough (but already exponentially small) upper bound on this probability by using that the oracle will output 0 whenever Y i is in S 0 , i.e.
Thus we can distinguish the output Y of C x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (k t , x t , y t ) ∈ T where Y = y t and for i = 2, . . . , t : x i = y i−1 (where t is maximal, i.e. (k, x, x 1 ) ∈ T for any k, x). Similarly it looks up the sequence (k 1 , x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (k t , x t , y t ) where y t = Y . Note that this means that Y and Y were computed as
Now, if there are i, j, i , j where i < j ≤ m, j < i ≤ m and
is 1 and guesses that it is 0 otherwise.
16 Having chosen plaintext access to a function T (.), we pick some key k and evaluate
, Y2}) will be 1, and if T (.) is a URF, then O(break, {Y1, Y2}) will almost certainly be 0. Thus we can distinguish F O (k, .) with random k from a U RF .
When the guess is 1, it is always correct by the definition of O(break, .). So we must show that when the guess is 0 then O(break, {Y, Y }) = 1 is very unlikely. First we assume that the random X 1 , . . . , X q ∈ Q are all in S 0 , this will hold but with probability q/2 n . Next, we assume that for the case where the Y i are computed as F O (k, X i ), A never makes a query O(eval, k, X) for any X. As k is random this will be true with probability at least q/2 n . Now if B O,A wrongly guesses that O(break, {Y, Y }) is 0, then the initial input x 1 or x 1 from (10) was not in S 0 . As x 1 and x 1 were not received as an output from O (otherwise we could extend one of the sequences of (10)), A has guessed a value outside of S 0 . As S 0 is a random subset which covers all but a 1/2 n fraction of possible inputs, the probability that A could have guessed an x 1 outside of S 0 is at most 1/2 n (same for x 1 ).
The lemma follows from the two claims above. 
A Proof of Lemma 2
Proof (of Lemma 2). To show that expansions of type G are good, we must show that for any expansion α of type G, the security of C α F as a weak random function can be black-box reduced to the security of F as a weak random function.
Let Adv A q (F, G) denote the advantage of the distinguisher A to distinguish the randomized function F from G in auery known-plaintext attack. More formally, consider the random variable Q F = (X 1 , . . . , X q , Y 1 , . . . , Y q ) where the X i 's are uniformly random and
We prove the following statement:
For any expansion α of type G, any randomized function F with range and domain {0, 1} n , there exists an adversary B such that for any ad-
Where α max = max(α 1 , . . . , α #α ). Moreover B only uses A and F as a black-box and it is efficient (basically, all that B has to do is to simulate C α F on q inputs and it invokes A only once). So if A breaks the security of C α F as a weak RF, then B breaks the security of the underlying F as a weak RF. For the special case of pseudorandom functions, this statement implies that if F is a weak PRF, then so is C α F . We now prove (11). Consider an expansion α = {s 1 , . . . , s t } of type G. We can assume without loss of generality that for all s ∈ α and 0 < i < j ≤ t it holds that s[i] < s[j] (as we can always permute the letters of an α of type G so that this holds).
For the proof it will be convenient to introduce a new random system. With B a,b we denote a random beacon {0, 1} a → {0, 1} b , this system is simply a random source which outputs a new uniformly random value in {0, 1} b on each input. As B a,b and R a,b have exactly the same output distribution unless queried twice on the same input, it is easy to show that for any A (e.g. using the framework from section 4 for the second step) 
To conclude the proof of (11) we must "replace" the beacons B in (15) by URFs R. Below we use the triangle inequality in the first and third, and (15) in the second step. In the last step we use (12) twice. 
Adv

